Shareware Overload Trio 2/Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO/dir33/hr_5199.zip/EN.LET

Internet Message Format | 1994-10-28 | 9KB

Date: Fri, 28 Oct 94 10:43:57 EDT
From: Carl Ellison <[e-mail]>
Subject: HR5199 cover letter


Thanks to John Young <[e-mail]> for scanning this in from a FAX
copy.

This is the cover letter on HR5199.  It starts out in a different tone from
the one in which it ends, so I would suggest reading it through before
reacting (something I failed to do when I first read it).

 - Carl

Scanning date: Thu, 27 Oct 1994 19:28:27 -0400

-------------------

     "Encryption Standards and Procedures Act of 1994"

              HON. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.

               of California

         In the House of Representatives

            Thursday, October 6, 1994

     Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 5199, the Encryption
Standards and Procedures Act of 1994.  The purpose of this legislation is
to establish Federal policy governing the development and use of encryption
technology for unclassified information that strikes the proper balance
between the public's right to private and secure communications and the
government's need to decipher information obtained through lawful
surveillance.

     The legislation would authorize the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) to develop and issue, by regulation, federal
encryption standards for ensuring privacy, security, and authenticity of
domestic and international electronic communications in a way that
preserves privacy rights and maintains the government's authority and
ability to conduct electronic surveillance.  The development of such
standards under a rulemaking process will ensure that all stakeholders have
an opportunity to influence the final program.  With respect to that
policy, the bill would permit wider use of encryption technology while
reasserting Fourth Amendment privacy rights and the government's authority
to conduct lawful electronic surveillance.  To ensure those rights are
preserved, the bill would impose new legal requirements on escrow agents
that may be part of an encryption standard established under the
legislation.  It would also establish a research and development program at
NIST to develop next generation encryption technology, and would authorize
the use of available appropriations to implement the legislation.

     Mr. Speaker, this administration has placed a high priority on
promoting the National Information Infrastructure (NII) and in realizing
fully the economic and social benefits of that infrastructure.  To achieve
these goals, which I strongly endorse, information communicated over the
NII must be secure, private, and authentic.  Otherwise, the public will not
fully use the NII and we will not realize its vast potential benefits.
Encryption technology provides this capability.

     During the Cold War, the Federal Government pursued a de facto policy
of suppressing private sector development, use, and export of encryption
technology for national security reasons.  Recent advancements in
encryption technology and its proliferation make enforcement of that policy
increasingly difficult.  Moreover, fulfilling the goals of the National
Information Infrastructure requires private and secure communications that
can only be achieved with encryption technology.  The widespread use of
that technology, however, threatens to impede the government's ability to
conduct lawful electronic surveillance.

     In February, 1994, the Administration responded to this dilemma by
formally adopting a voluntary federal Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
for electronic voice communications known as "Clipper".  The standard would
be implemented in computer chips that use a classified mathematical formula
to encrypt unclassified telephone conversations and computer data
transmitted over public telephone networks.  Authorized government agencies
can decode those communications by presenting a legal request to two escrow
agents, which would hold two halves of a mathematical key that can decipher
the code.

     The purposes of Clipper are two fold -- first, to provide a means to
safeguard public and private electronic voice communications and, second,
to enable government law enforcement authorities and intelligence gathering
agencies to decipher such coummunications that have been lawfully
intercepted.  Similar voluntary standards for electronic data
communications are under development by the government and may soon be
issued.  The Administration contends that it has authority under the
Computer Security Act to issue such standards.  Others, however, have
raised concerns about the proper interpretation and application of the Act
with respect to Clipper and similar standards.

     The Computer Secuirty Act, which the Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology reported and the Congress enacted in 1987, authorized NIST, in
consultation with other appropriate federal agencies, to develop and issue
standards and guidelines for protecting "unclassified, sensitive
information" in "federal computer systems".  The Act did not explicitly
contemplate the development or issuance of standards for safeguarding
private communications and satisfying the information needs of law
enforcement and the intelligence community.  Such communications are
considered private property subject to separate and distinct constitutional
rights and legal protections.  The Administration's interpretation of the
Computer Security Act to cover such matters appears to go beyond the
original intent of the Act and may be inconsistent with other law
pertaining to individual privacy, protection of private property, and
government authority to conduct lawful electronic surveillance.

     In testimony at hearings before our Committee, witnesses from industry
and privacy groups objected to the secretive way Clipper was developed, and
stated that the initiative does not go far enough to promote widespread use
of encryption technology.  They argued that the program will hamper
business opportunities for United States firms, may infringe on individual
privacy rights, and is prone to abuse.  The Administration refutes these
claims and intends to proceed with the initiative arguing that it is
essential for public safety and national security.  The issue currently is
stalemated unless there is legislation or third party intervention.

     The Administration has publicly stated that it does not intend to seek
legislation expressly authorizing Clipper or any other federal encryption
standard because it wants flexibility to modify its encryption policy and
program in response to changing circumstances.  The Administration's desire
for flexibility, however, contributes to the public's mistrust and
opposition to Clipper.  The proposal was developed under an administrative
directive and, therefore, could just as easily be changed in a way that
might be construed to diminish privacy rights without giving the public
adequate opportunity to affect the program.  For this reason alone, the
public is unlikely to ever accept Clipper Chip in its present form.

     I, along with others, believe that a viable approach to gain public
support for an initiative like Clipper is legislation to codify encryption
policy and govern how that policy would be implemented.  In so doing, all
stakeholders would have an opportunity to influence policy.  The final
program would have been subjected to greater scrutiny and its
implementation would be under the rule of law.  It may well be that only
under these circumstances would the public accept a federal encryption
standard and the needs of law enforcement could be satisfied without
compromising privacy rights.

     The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) issued in September an
extensive report entitled "Information Security and Privacy Network
Environments" that is consistent with this view.  The report concluded that
"appropriate institutional and technical safeguards are required for a
broad range of personal ... information, [o]therwise, concerns for the
security and privacy of networked information may limit the usefulness and
acceptance of the global information infrastructure."  OTA also stated that
such safeguards can only be developed successfully through an "open
process" and with congressional involvement so the views of all affected
parties can be considered properly in arriving at a final outcome.  Public
trust in government and acceptance of federal encryption standards can only
be achieved through such a process.  This sentiment was shared by most
respondents to a draft of the bill circulated earlier this Summer for
comments.

     Mr. Speaker, the bill I have introduced today has been drafted, not as
a perfect solution to the problem of privacy and security in the electronic
information age, but as a means for getting the various factions to talk to
each other in an open process to reach a sensible and effective resolution
of this critical issue.  I invite all interested parties to comment on the
bill.  My intention is to modify the bill to reflect comments made and to
introduce it again early in the 104th Congress for consideration by this
body.

[End]